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After many years of neglect, recent research has added considerably to our 
knowledge of inequality dynamics in preindustrial times.1 We now have good-
quality, data-rich reconstructions of long-term trends in (mostly wealth, sometimes 
income) inequality for many parts of Italy,2 Spain,3 Portugal,4 the Low Countries,5 
Germany6 and Sweden.7 Other research focused on single years for which excep-
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tionally good information was available, for example in Spain in 17598 or in Poland 
in 1578,9 or provided more tentative estimates of overall inequality based on social 
tables, particularly for England.10 This broad research campaign reached beyond 
Europe, as preindustrial inequality was explored also for Anatolia under the Otto-
man Empire,11 for the pre-revolutionary United States,12 and for Japan in the late 
Tokugawa period.13  
A considerable part of the data which has recently become available about pre-
industrial inequality has been produced by the ERC-funded project EINITE – Eco-
nomic Inequality across Italy and Europe 1300-1800,14 whose work is currently being 
continued and extended to other subjects (social mobility) by another ERC-funded 
project, SMITE – Social Mobility and Inequality across Italy and Europe 1300-1800. 
EINITE covered a range of Italian pre-unification states, plus other European are-
as including the Low Countries, England, Germany, south France and Catalonia. 
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the results produced by 
EINITE for some of these areas, and particularly for Italy and for the Low Coun-
tries (this choice is partly due to the fact that research is still ongoing for the other 
areas, and partly to space constraints).  
This first section of the chapter focuses on the historical sources used and on 
the methods employed to study inequality and to reconstruct aggregate “regional” 
measures from community-level data. The second section presents synthetically the 
main results obtained. The third section provides an overview of different interpre-
tations about the main factors shaping distributive dynamics in the long run. 
1. SOURCES AND METHODS 
Most of the recent studies of preindustrial inequality listed in the introduction 
make use of fiscal sources to reconstruct wealth distributions. In particular for 
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southern Europe, the sources more commonly used are the property tax records 
usually called estimi in Italy, cadastres in France and similarly elsewhere. These 
sources contain information about the taxable wealth owned by each household. 
This always includes real estate (lands and buildings), and sometimes other items as 
well, like capital invested in trade. Real estate, however, was the most important 
component of wealth, and by far. For preindustrial societies, in which most of the 
product was agrarian, wealth inequality is also a good proxy of income inequality, 
not only because the property of land (or more precisely, the right to the use of 
land) was of great importance in defining how the total product was distributed, but 
also because it is very unlikely that, in such a society, income and wealth inequality 
could move in different directions – a particularly important circumstance as the 
way in which inequality changes is more relevant, in the long run, than its level, as 
will be seen in the next section. Even for the period of the Industrial Revolution it 
has been argued that concentration of wealth followed the same path as that of in-
come.15 Finally, in most circumstances wealth inequality is the only possible proxy 
for preindustrial income inequality, and overall it does not seem to be a worse indi-
cator than others that have been used to study income distribution.16 
As a rule, the Italian estimi include only taxable property, consequently they 
omit feudal property and property owned by the Church (more specifically, by reli-
gious institutions such as monasteries or cathedral chapters) ab antiquo (‘since an-
cient times’). However they include the property acquired by the Church after the 
estimi were introduced, as this was not, or not fully, exempt. Sometimes exempt 
property was included in the registers but it was not considered when calculating 
the tax distribution.17 This is not, however, a major concern as arguably what we 
should be interested in is the distribution of household wealth, hence excluding that 
owned by institutions. After all today, too, household surveys do not include insti-
tutional incomes or property.  
It is necessary to clarify what an estimo value is. The value given to taxable prop-
erty was not a market value but a measure of the fiscal capacity generated by each 
piece of property, which is also why in some instances the house of residence was 
not subject to taxation. However, we can reasonably assume that the estimo values 
were proportional to the market values, or at least to the values prevailing in the 
market at the time when the estimo was compiled. In fact, if a new estimo provided 
evaluations largely discordant with market values, widespread protest for unjust 
taxation would have followed immediately. Moreover, when the values of an out-
dated estimo started diverging noticeably from market values, political pressure built 
up to change the estimo. This being said, many years could pass before a new estimo 
was introduced: compiling it was an expensive process because the evaluation and 
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description of the recorded property had to be precise, reliable, and “fair”. Moreo-
ver parts of the local society, expecting an increase in their fiscal burden, might try 
to slow down the process or to make it fail entirely. Finally individuals, families, or 
whole social-economic groups could try to influence the evaluation process.18 For 
all these reasons, no estimo can be thought to perfectly reflect market values or the 
fiscal capacity generated by property, but at the same time it can be considered to 
provide a very good proxy for it, at least in distributional terms. After all, no evalua-
tion of the fiscal capacity of taxpayers has ever proved faultless – until today. An 
additional problem in using these sources is that the values recorded in the estimi are 
often difficult to convert into (approximate) market values expressed in a common 
currency.19 This, however, is not a problem when comparing measures like the Gini 
index, which is a pure number. But it has consequences when attempting to com-
bine the local series into aggregate series, as seen below. 
The main limitation of the estimi, the cadastres and of all the property tax records 
of their kind is that they only rarely include the propertyless, that is, those house-
holds that had no taxable wealth. However, such households are usually very few 
(3-7% of the total in Italy), as even tiny properties were recorded, like a small or-
chard or a fraction of vineyard. Consequently although the exclusion of the proper-
tyless from inequality measurement leads to systematic under-estimation of 
inequality levels, the distortion is very limited.20 More importantly, empirically we 
find that including the propertyless does not change the direction of the trend.21 
Taking into account what has been discussed above about the characteristics of 
the estimi, all the information used in the following for Italy has to be considered 
related to household-levels distributions of wealth inequality, propertyless excluded 
(in order to compare like with like, the propertyless have been removed in the rare 
instances when they have been recorded). Based on these distributions, it is possi-
ble to calculate a variety of measures of inequality, including the Gini index which is 
by far the most commonly used. In the standardized version used here, the Gini 
index varies between the value of 0, which corresponds to perfect equality (each 
individual/household has the same income/wealth) and 1, which corresponds to 
perfect inequality (one individual/household earns/owns everything). An example 
of the results obtained from applying these simple statistical instruments to wealth 
distributions reconstructed from archival data is presented in Graph 1, which 
 
18 About these phenomena, see for example the case study of Imola: C. ROTELLI, La distribuzione 
della proprietà terriera e delle colture a Imola nel XVII e XVIII secolo, Milano 1966, pp. 33-42; IDEM, La 
finanza locale pontificia nel Cinquecento: il caso di Imola, in “Studi storici”, IV, 1968, pp. 115-18. 
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from 1537 to 1702 the distortion to the level of the Gini index varied from a minimum of 0.006 Gini 
points in 1640 (from 0.715 excluding the propertyless to 0.721 including them) to a maximum of 0.03 
Gini points in 1610 (from 0.723 to 0.753). G. ALFANI and M. DI TULLIO, The Lion’s Share, cit. 
21 For further discussion, see G. ALFANI, Economic Inequality in Northwestern Italy, cit.; IDEM, The rich 
in historical perspective, cit.;   G. ALFANI, M. DI TULLIO, The Lion’s Share, cit.  
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shows the tendencies in inequality found in six small cities of the Sabaudian State 
(in the nowadays Italian region of Piedmont). 
 
Graph 1. Long-term trends in economic inequality in cities of  the Sabaudian State 
(Piedmont). Gini indexes of  wealth concentration 
 
As can easily be seen, the series show an impressive degree of coherence in the 
trends they follow: inequality growth was nearly monotonic from ca. 1450, while in 
the late Middle Ages a phase of inequality decline was found, triggered by the Black 
Death plague affecting Piedmont from 1348. These trends will be discussed further 
in the next section. Here, it is important to underline the fact that the very coher-
ence of the trends that have been detected for each community in the areas ex-
plored systematically by the EINITE and SMITE projects suggests that it is 
possible and useful to try and provide an overall measure of distributive dynamics 
across broad areas: regions or entire states. But there is another reason why produc-
ing inequality measures representative of entire regions or states is desirable: such 
measures are a useful synthesis of a range of relevant variables which is broader 
than the simple sum of local distributions, variables that are important to assess 
properly distribution across large areas. In particular, they take into account differ-
ences in average wealth/income levels between different communities, territories, 
or environments (especially city vs country). 
Producing these measures, however, presents some challenges. To overcome 
them, a specific method has been developed. Introduced in my study of the Sabau-
dian State,22 later it has been applied to the Florentine State (Tuscany) as well as to 
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the southern Low Countries23 and more recently to the Republic of Venice24 and to 
Germany.25 The method is being applied also to the Kingdom of Naples.26 
To build proper regional measures of inequality it does not suffice to calculate 
averages of local Gini indexes or of other inequality measures, as this would cause a 
loss of crucial information about between-community inequality. Instead, the 
method consists in the construction of regional distributions starting from simpli-
fied, or “fictitious” distributions modeled on information about deciles of in-
come/wealth. For each community, a distribution of 100 elements, or “fictitious 
households”, is modeled: 10 fictitious households per decile, each having the same 
share of wealth (1/10 of the decile each). The tenth decile (the rich) is modeled in 
greater detail, using information about the top 5% and top 1% wealthy, as it is usu-
ally found empirically that what happens to the top rich disproportionately influ-
ences the overall trend in terms of Gini values. 
Using these fictitious distributions it becomes easier to solve weighting prob-
lems and issues of comparability across sources, making the task of aggregating 
community-level data to produce regional reconstructions a relatively easy one.27 
First, separate urban and rural inequality series are constructed, which are then 
weighed based on the urbanization rate in each time period to obtain the final, 
overall regional distribution. For example, Alfani and Ryckbosch in their recon-
struction of the regional distribution of Tuscany assumed a 20% urbanization rate 
constant over time (coherently with the available information about urbanization 
trends in that region).28 This implied, for each year, building a regional distribution 
in which urban entries (i.e. the number of “fictitious households”) corresponded 
exactly to the above shares of the total. This procedure is similar in principle to that 
described by Milanovic for calculating “weighted international inequality”.29 Some-
times, the lack of appropriate data requires additional assumptions in order to build 
the regional distribution. Earlier applications of this method provided adequate so-
lutions for many of these practical problems, solutions which have been replicated 
in later studies in order to increase comparability. For example in the case of the 
Sabaudian State, it was impossible to convert the values in the property tax registers 
of one community to another, except for the Canavese area in 1628-49 – so the as-
sumption was made, that the urban-rural differential in average household wealth 
across Piedmont was the same as in the seventeenth-century Canavese.30 Later, a 
similar problem (though to a somewhat lesser scale) was found in the study of the 
Republic of Venice. Here, complete information, expressed in the same unit of 
measurement, was available for the province of Padua. Based on this and incorpo-
rating some additional information about territorial variation across the Venetian 
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Terraferma, it has been possible to produce an estimate of the average rural/urban 
wealth ratio across the Republic of Venice (or more precisely, its Italian domains 
i.e. the above-mentioned Terraferma).  
For reasons of synthesis, I will refer to the above-mentioned publications for 
more details and practical information about the method developed for the con-
struction of the aggregate, territorial distributions. The most detailed description of 
the method refers to the case of the Republic of Venice.31 Here, as a conclusion, it 
will suffice to underline that the final outcome is a distribution representative of 
broad areas, a distribution which can then be explored on its own with any appro-
priate statistical instrument. Such distribution is itself the result of a weighted ag-
gregation of two other distributions, one related to the cities and one the rural 
areas. As an example, Graph 2 presents the case of the Sabaudian State (more pre-
cisely, the part of such state corresspoding to nowadays Piedmont), showing the 
series of Gini indexes calculated on the urban, on the rural and on the overall dis-
tributions. As can easily be noticed, the urban series reflect very well the local 
tendencies presented in Graph 1. Another important point to underline is that the 
overall series tends to follow more closely the rural than the urban series. This is 
because the vast majority of the Piedmontese population lived in the countryside 
(urbanization rates, for cities over 5,000 inhabitants, varied in the 23-26% range 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). For the same reason, the aggre-
gate series tends to reflect more closely the rural series also in all other cases for 
which this kind of regional study has been produced. 
Graph 2.  Long-term trends in inequality in the Sabaudian State (Piedmont).  
Gini indexes of  wealth concentration. 
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2. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN 
PERIOD: AN OVERVIEW 
In the earlier section, some information has been shown about long-term 
trends in inequality in the Sabaudian State (Piedmont). The trends found for this 
European area are very similar to those which have been reconstructed elsewhere 
and overall, this recent research allows to establish two key features of preindustrial 
inequality trends in Europe during 1300-1800: 
 
1) during the entire period, the only generalized phase of sustained inequality 
decline was triggered by the Black Death epidemic, affecting the continent during 
1347-51; 
2) after this phase of decline, and beginning from ca. 1450 (with some 
regional variation), both income and wealth inequality tended to increase almost 
monotonically in almost all the areas for which we have evidence. 
 
These tendencies are clearly visible in Graphs 3a and 3b, which report the Gini 
index and the share of the richest 10% for some Italian states and for the southern 
and northern Low Countries. The measures refer to wealth inequality for Italy and 
to income inequality for the Low Countries32 – hence the trends, not the levels, 
should be compared (as wealth tends to be more concentrated than income, in the 
past as with today).   
 
 
32 Information about income inequality in the Low Countries has been obtained from rental 
values of houses, that a consolidated literature has shown to reflect quite well relative levels of income 
(see J.L. VAN ZANDEN, Tracing the beginning of the Kuznets Curve, cit.; L. SOLTOW, J.L. VAN ZANDEN, 
Income and wealth inequality in the Netherlands, 16th-20th centuries, Amsterdam 1998. 
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Graph 3.  Long-term trends in economic inequality in Italy and the Low Countries, 
1300-1800 
a. Gini indexes 
 
 
b. Share of the top 10% 
 
Notes: The series refer to wealth inequality for the Sabaudian State, the Florentine State and the Re-
public of Venice (excluding those with no property), and to income inequality for the southern and 
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The longest aggregate series that it has been possible to reconstruct so far refers 
to the cities of the Sabaudian State (Piedmont). There, before the Black Death the 
Gini index of wealth concentration equalled 0.715. By 1350, in the immediate af-
termath of the Black Death, it had declined to 0.669. Decline continued in the fol-
lowing years, and the absolute minimum value reported for this area in the entire 
period 1300 to 1800 was reached around 1450, with a Gini of 0.609. After that, in-
equality growth resumed, continuing without interruption for about two and a half 
centuries. Indeed, only by the mid-seventeenth century the pre-plague inequality 
levels were finally exceeded. Inequality growth stalled in the cities of Piedmont dur-
ing the first half of the eighteenth century, but became intense again in the second 
half of the century, peaking at 0.777 by 1800 (if we look at the entire region, not 
just cities, inequality growth continued throughout the century). The same path is 
found looking at the share of the richest 10%, who owned 61.3% of all wealth in 
1300, 46.8% in 1450, and 68.9% in 1800, as well as at the other Italian states.33 Dur-
ing the early modern period, inequality growth (of income) is also found in the 
northern and southern Low Countries. 
The distributive consequences of the Black Death are worthy of specific atten-
tion. For such an early period, evidence is relatively scarce and to date it involves 
mostly the Sabaudian State,34 the Florentine State35 and the southern Low Coun-
tries.36 Although only for the Sabaudian State we have an aggregate series covering 
the pre- and post-Black Death, for each of these areas we can observe some specif-
ic communities before and after this terrible mortality crisis. For all available cases, 
inequality declined immediately after the Black Death, with a tendency to continue 
for about 50 to 100 years, depending on the area. For example in the city of Prato 
in Tuscany, the Gini index of wealth inequality was 0.703 in 1325, but by 1372 it 
had fallen to an all-time low of 0.591 (between the two dates, the share of the rich-
est 10% declined from 65.7% to 48.1%, to the advantage of all other segments of 
the wealth distribution). Again in Tuscany, in the rural community of Poggibonsi 
the Gini index was 0.550 in 1338, but only 0.474 in 1357, after the Black Death.37 It 
should be noted that inequality decline after this, which was probably the most ter-
rible mortality crisis to have ever affected Europe (it killed up to 50% of the popu-
lation on the continent), is the outcome that should be expected as it goes hand-in-
hand with increasing real wages following the sharp reduction in the offer of la-
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bour, which contributed to reducing income inequality. Reduction in wealth ine-
quality (and consequently, in capital income inequality) is also to be expected, as 
higher real wages provided a larger part of the population with the means to acquire 
property – in a context in which much more real estate than usual was being of-
fered on the market, leading to cheaper prices.38 
For the early modern period, the almost monotonic inequality growth reported 
in Graph 3 seems to reflect well an overall tendency across Europe. Germany is a 
partial exception, as there we find traces of a temporary phase of inequality decline 
associated to the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), which was the most destructive con-
flict of early modern Europe.39 Another possible exception is Portugal, for which 
some evidence of early modern (income) inequality decline has been produced. 
Possibly this was the consequence of “a long wave of agriculture-based economic 
expansion during which the demand for labour mostly ran ahead of that for 
land”.40 For the rest of Europe, however, a growing body of literature has been dis-
cussing the factors leading to inequality growth, as will be seen in the next section. 
Before moving to tentative explanations of preindustrial inequality dynamics, it is 
worth underlining a final empirical tendency arising from recent studies: the ability 
of changes in the wealth or income share of the top of the distribution (in Graph 
3b, the richest 10%) to shape the overall inequality trend as measured by Gini in-
dexes (just compare Graph 3a to 3b). This finding, which is not a statistical necessi-
ty but simply an empirical regularity, is also to be found in contemporary societies.41 
3. ON THE DETERMINANTS OF INEQUALITY GROWTH IN EARLY MODERN TIMES 
The currently-available data give the clear impression that during late medieval 
and early modern times, the underlying tendency of both wealth and income ine-
quality has been orientated towards growth. As a matter of fact, the only significant 
decline in wealth and income inequality is associated to a large-scale catastrophe: 
the fourteenth-century Black Death. As discussed in the earlier section, explaining 
inequality decline after the Black Death is quite straightforward, as it seems to fol-
low “naturally” from an increase in real wages fuelled by labour shortages, the 
availability of more property being offered on the market, and finally, the fragmen-
tation of large patrimonies caused by unmitigated particle inheritance systems.42 But 
explaining inequality growth in early modern times is somewhat trickier, as the fac-
tors able to determine inequality growth in the long run of history are currently the 
object of intense debates which for reasons of space could not be covered exhaust-
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ively here. Hence, the objective of this section is simply to provide an overview of 
some of these debates, focusing on the early modern period.43 
A first important point to underline, is that preindustrial inequality growth (ei-
ther rural or urban) could not be presented simply as a by-product of economic 
growth. Indeed, economic growth may contribute to explaining some cases, like 
that of the Dutch Republic after it gained independence and went through its 
Golden Age. It seems, in fact, that this case has been pivotal in spreading among 
economic historians the idea that inequality grows together with per capita GDP, 
ever since the seminal article by Van Zanden on Holland.44 Van Zanden, in his 
turn, presented his interpretation as an extension of the famous hypothesis put 
forward by Kuznets,45 according to which income inequality followed an inverted-
U path through the industrialization process (the so-called “Kuznets Curve”), with 
a rising phase at the beginning of industrialization. This path would be the conse-
quence of economic development, and particularly of the transfer of the workforce 
from a traditional (agrarian) sector to an advanced (industrial) one. Note that Kuz-
nets’s hypothesis referred to income inequality, however it stands to reason that it 
can also be applied to wealth.46 For Van Zanden, in the Dutch Republic inequality 
growth at the onset of the industrialization process merged with a longer phase of 
rising inequality covering the early modern period – resulting in what he called a 
“super-Kuznets curve”. In his view, preindustrial inequality growth was even “over-
explained” by economic growth. He proposed different explanations for why eco-
nomic growth could foster inequality growth: (i) urbanization (hence, transfer of 
workforce from a rural/backward sector to an urban/relatively advanced one); (ii) 
increasing skill premium; (iii) changes in the functional distribution of income. Van 
Zanden’s interpretation was grounded in the specific context of the Dutch Repub-
lic, one of the most economically dynamic areas of early modern Europe. Recently, 
somewhat similar views have been expressed by Bas Van Bavel who argued, based 
on evidence for some specific periods and areas including the Dutch Republic dur-
ing the seventeenth century, that inequality increase was associated with the devel-
opment of market economies, which may have led to growth in inequality of both 
income and wealth through increases in the efficient scale of trade and production, 
growing opportunities for financial dealing and speculation, growing investment 
opportunities (favouring the elites) in landed property and in shares of the public 
debt.47 Although admittedly Van Bavel hints at the possibility that, after a certain 
 
43 For a more complete and systematic treatment of this complex matter, see G. ALFANI, Wealth 
and Income Inequality in the long run of history, in C. DIEBOLT and M. HUPERT eds., Handbook of Cliometrics, 
2ns Edition, Berlin-Heidelberg 2019; G. ALFANI and M. DI TULLIO, The Lion’s Share, cit.; G. ALFANI, 
Economic inequality in preindustrial times: Europe and beyond, in “Journal of Economic Literature”, 
forthcoming. 
44 J.L. VAN ZANDEN, Tracing the beginning of the Kuznets Curve, cit. 
45 S. KUZNETS, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, in “American Economic Review”, 45, 1955, 
n. 1, pp. 1-28. 
46 P.H. LINDERT, Toward a comparative history of income and wealth inequality, cit.; IDEM, Making the most 
of Capital in the 21st Century, cit. 
47 B. VAN BAVEL, The Invisible Hand? How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined since AD 500, 
Oxford 2016, pp. 192-193. 
METHODS AND RESULTS FROM THE EINITE PROJECT 33
level of markets development, further inequality increases might occur even in the 
absence of substantial economic growth and as a consequence of  concentration of 
political power in the hands of the wealthiest, the fact remains that for him, in mar-
ket economies “inequality grows most in the phases in which economic growth is 
more conspicuous”.48 
It is surely possible, even probable, that the inequality growth that has charac-
terized the Dutch Republic during the early modern period was, at least in part, the 
consequence of economic growth. However, this argument could not be general-
ized to the rest of Europe, where income and wealth inequality growth were also 
found in periods of economic stagnation, or decline.49 This was, for example, the 
case in many Italian states50 as well as in the southern Low Countries51 and, as will 
be seen, this is why much recent literature has been looking in other directions for 
an explanation of preindustrial inequality growth. After all, even for modern times 
it is now clear that the association between inequality growth and economic devel-
opment can no longer be described in simple “Kuznetsian” terms: “the recent in-
crease [in income inequality] since around 1980… does not fit the [Kuznetsian] 
predicted earnings dynamics within the distribution. As an increasing number be-
come skilled, the difference within the top should decrease, not increase as seems 
to be the case”.52 Moreover, the decline in income inequality in the first half of the 
twentieth century also does not easily fit the Kuznets curve paradigm, as the decline 
was driven, to a large degree at least, by the dynamics of capital income, and not of 
labour income.53 From all the above considerations, the conclusion can be reached 
that “there is no mechanical relationship between inequality and industrialization or 
technological change. It is no more unavoidable that inequality increases in early 
stages of introducing new technology, than it is automatic that inequality eventually 
goes down”.54 For these and other reasons, many scholars have argued that we 
should move definitely beyond the idea of the Kuznets curve.55 Similar views have 
also been expressed about preindustrial times, and more generally the idea that 
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ively here. Hence, the objective of this section is simply to provide an overview of 
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level of markets development, further inequality increases might occur even in the 
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economic growth should be considered as the most obvious culprit in inequality 
growth has been challenged directly.56 
Beyond economic growth, other factors that have been considered capable of 
promoting inequality growth in the long run include population growth and urbani-
zation (which is itself a possible indicator of economic growth), as well as proletari-
anization: that is, the process leading a share of the European population, growing 
throughout the early modern period, to lose the ownership of the means of produc-
tion, thus becoming dependent on selling their labour for wages. Some of these fac-
tors, and particularly proletarianization,57 do seem able to contribute to explain 
distributive dynamics in some periods and areas. They, however, could not be taken 
as exclusive or even principal explanations of early modern inequality growth, either 
because empirically they are found to be no better (and sometime quite worse) cor-
related with inequality growth than economic growth, or because they refer to pro-
cesses that affected Europe in waves, like in the case of proletarianization,58 or 
however in a discontinuous way, and so seem unable to determine the smooth 
monotonic trends shown in Graph 3. Consequently, here they will not be discussed 
further, referring to other publications for a more detailed analysis.59 
If we look for general explanations, political-institutional factors currently seem 
to be the most promising. Recently, Scheidel has underlined the connection be-
tween political power and the building of great fortunes in early modern times, es-
pecially in the context of large empires, like the Ottoman or the Spanish, or of 
highly centralized states like the Kingdom of France.60 He also argued more gener-
ally that “in the long run, political and material inequality evolved in tandem”,61 but 
did not describe in detail the actual mechanisms leading to this result. Generally 
speaking, there is little doubt that in a preindustrial context, political power could 
be a crucial tool in building a fortune. However, in medieval and early modern Eu-
rope, while this might explain a significant part of the tendencies affecting the top 
rich, we find a much more encompassing process of wealth concentration, which 
affected the entire society – leading, in fact, to growing polarization: throughout the 
early modern period, the poorest strata of society became increasingly distant both 
from the high and the middle strata.62 To understand this process, it is important to 
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look closer at some crucial institutional developments, which were surely connected 
to, but did not merely mirror, changes in the distribution of political power. I refer 
in particular to the rise of the fiscal-military state. 
From ca. 1500, the growing cost of warfare increased states’ financial needs. In 
turn, a larger and more efficient military allowed for concentration of coercive 
power, providing the means to impose a growing fiscal extraction. This led to the 
deepening of states’ fiscal capacity and to increases in the per capita fiscal burden.63 
For example, in the period ca. 1550 to 1780, per capita fiscal pressure more than 
trebled in the Sabaudian State, increased six-fold in France and almost seven-fold in 
England and the Dutch Republic. Such increases were able to produce, by them-
selves, greater inequality as the structure of the preindustrial fiscal systems was 
overall regressive: the effective tax rates paid by those at the top were lower than 
those suffered by the bottom of society. Consequently, contrary to what is com-
mon in modern advanced societies, post-tax inequality was greater than pre-tax ine-
quality. This was the consequence of a regime of systematic privilege, enrooted in 
law and institutions as well as in a culture that favoured nobles over commoners, 
citizens over rural dwellers, and so on. Regressive taxation affected both the in-
come and wealth distribution (note that in the long run, the total income distribu-
tion tends to shape the wealth distribution through the mechanism of savings). As 
the structure of early modern fiscal systems did not change much during the early 
modern period, remaining markedly regressive, the increase in per-capita taxation 
caused by the rise of the fiscal-military state was able to also increase the capacity of 
such fiscal systems to promote more and more inequality growth over time. As a 
possible explanation for preindustrial inequality growth, increase in per-capita (re-
gressive) taxation has two particularly desirable features: it was a pan-European 
phenomenon, and it progressed in a basically monotonic way during the early mod-
ern period in most areas of the continent – which is exactly what we need in order 
to explain general trends of the kind shown in Graph 3. Additionally, the process of 
the rise of the fiscal-military state and of the parallel increase in the per capita fiscal 
burden involved all European states independently from their economic conditions, 
as all had to play the same game if they were to protect themselves or to be able to 
project military power outside their boundaries. Consequently, it can be used to ex-
plain the numerous instances of preindustrial inequality growth in stagnant or de-
clining economies.64 
A recent study has analysed the case of the Republic of Venice or more specifi-
cally of its Italian domains, the Terraferma.65 Here, during the early modern period 
the effective overall fiscal rate weighing on the poorest 10% of the population 
might have been as little as 20-25%, and as much as 55-60% higher than that paid 
by the richest 5%, taking into account both direct and indirect taxation. The regres-
sive structure of the fiscal levy did not change significantly over time, but as else-
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as all had to play the same game if they were to protect themselves or to be able to 
project military power outside their boundaries. Consequently, it can be used to ex-
plain the numerous instances of preindustrial inequality growth in stagnant or de-
clining economies.64 
A recent study has analysed the case of the Republic of Venice or more specifi-
cally of its Italian domains, the Terraferma.65 Here, during the early modern period 
the effective overall fiscal rate weighing on the poorest 10% of the population 
might have been as little as 20-25%, and as much as 55-60% higher than that paid 
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where, per-capita fiscal pressure increased: by about 70% from the mid-sixteenth to 
the mid-eighteenth century. Although this increase was more moderate than else-
where (partly because levels of taxation in the sixteenth-century Terraferma were rel-
atively quite high to begin with), it is still significant and able to increase 
considerably the ability of the fiscal system to promote further inequality growth. 
This view is strengthened by the consideration that the main reasons for collecting 
more and more resources – war and the service of public debt, itself mostly accu-
mulated to pay for war and defence – did not lead to inequality reduction as the 
consequence of state expenditure, differently from what we are used to today when 
welfare and social spending represent the largest component of the public budget. 
On the contrary: in preindustrial settings, state expenditures probably further fa-
voured inequality growth.66  
Although it seems certain that during the early modern period the rise of the 
fiscal-military state played a very important role in favouring inequality growth 
across Europe, this was surely not the only factor at work. Other factors might 
have played an important, and even a crucial role in at least some specific historical 
phases. Indeed, it is probably wrong to focus research solely on identifying a single 
unifying cause of long-term inequality growth. In fact, as is arguably also the case 
for research on inequality trends in more recent epochs,67 we should openly recog-
nize that the main causes explaining distributive dynamics can vary across space 
and time. Additionally, the exceptional vitality shown in recent years by studies of 
historical inequality suggests that the availability of good-quality information will 
continue to increase at a steady place, allowing us to explore in greater depth the 
factors at work and the very nature of the historical processes that underlie distribu-
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LA MARCA ALL’INTERNO DELLO STATO PONTIFICIO 
È fin troppo scontato ricordare come la Marca in Età Tardo-medievale e Mo-
derna differisse sensibilmente, nei confini geografici o amministrativi, dalla regione 
attuale; per avere una immagine storicamente corretta dell’area è necessario piutto-
sto inserirla nel più ampio quadro dello Stato della Chiesa che, come è noto, fu ca-
ratterizzato per molti secoli dalla compresenza sul proprio territorio di autorità 
concorrenti e legittime, indipendenti l’una dall’altra. Il sistema di potere e le istitu-
zioni che si andarono strutturando tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna modellarono lo 
Stato Pontificio, e il potere temporale dei papi, in un modo diverso da ogni altra or-
ganizzazione politica di Antico regime. La storiografia più recente tende tuttavia a 
sottolineare alcuni aspetti che risultano comuni a tutti gli stati italiani fino e oltre 
l’Età Moderna, ovvero l’occupazione dello spazio politico da parte di una pluralità 
di gruppi di potere e di comunità con diritti di auto-organizzazione, ma legati al so-
vrano da patti di sottomissione. 
Lo stato regionale più consistente del centro-nord della penisola italiana, alme-
no dal punto di vista geografico, nacque mediante un’acquisizione progressiva ma 
discontinua di realtà politico-territoriali che spesso si manifestava nella riafferma-
zione dell’autorità dello Stato Pontificio su territori già da lungo tempo posseduti, 
ma sottomessi solo formalmente. Questa lunga tradizione di autonomia nelle aree 
periferiche impedì in molti casi l’abbattimento dei vecchi ordinamenti locali che 
spesso – per impossibilità o precisa scelta politica – furono mantenuti in vita nella 
pienezza delle loro funzioni amministrative, fiscali e giurisdizionali. 
Questo aspetto, retaggio tra l’altro di uno spiccato particolarismo feudale, era 
evidenziato dalla tipologia di sottomissione delle città o terre soggette alla Santa Se-
de. Si suole infatti distinguere, dato il loro status giuridico, tra quelle che erano di-
rettamente soggette (immediate subiectae) e quelle poste sotto il dominio di un signore 
 
* La ricerca ha beneficiato di un finanziamento dello European Research Council, nel contesto 
del Settimo Programma Quadro dell'Unione Europea (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement No. 
283802, EINITE-Economic Inequality across Italy and Europe, 1300-1800, nonché del programma 
Horizon 2020 dell'Unione Europea, Horizon 2020 Framework Program/ERC Grant agreement No. 
725687, SMITE-Social Mobility and Inequality across Italy and Europe, 1300-1800. 
